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Abstract 
The newly established provincial healthcare commissions 
in Pakistan have started certification of healthcare 
providers. The policy-makers perceive that without third-
party certification or licencing the 
healthcare quality will be suboptimal in the 
country. This paper reviews the current 
literature on third-party certification and 
studies objectives and progress of the 
largest healthcare commission in Pakistan. 
It analyses the certification role of the 
Punjab Healthcare Commission and draw 
lessons for future regulation and 
strengthening of the quality reporting 
process. It also documents the short-term 
and long-term trade-off resulting from the 
enforcement of quality certification in the 
absence of appropriate alternative 
investment in medical training and care 
provisions in the country for uncertified 
providers. The paper concludes with a 
roadmap for future research to improve 
healthcare regulation in Pakistan. 




The regulation of healthcare industry in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) is minimal.1 LMICs in general, 
and South Asia in particular have mixed health systems 
where private and public healthcare services exist in 
parallel. There is a large government-funded national 
health system in many LMICs which is in some sense 
regulated due to standard operating rules and 
government ownership, but the substantial portion of 
demand of health services fall on private and non-
government health system, and this fact can be validated 
by comparing out-of-pocket expenses on healthcare in 
South Asia, LMICs and high-income countries (HICs).2 The 
private expenditures make up 57% of the total spending 
in South Asia compared to 24% in HIC, and out-of-pocket 
payments represent almost half of the current health 
expenditures in South Asia (Figure-1). Given the nature 
and extent of mixed health system, the regulation of 
private healthcare is an important agenda item in 
healthcare policy in LMICs, including South Asia.  
In addition, the transactions in healthcare industry 
involve imperfect information, where supplier of the 
service (a doctor) has different set of information than the 
consumer (patient) or in majority of the cases has more 
knowledge (asymmetric information) about the type of 
treatment required.3 In the context of poor countries, 
asymmetric information in medical care generates 
incentives for the healthcare practitioner to oversubscribe 
or wrongly subscribe (e.g. quackery). This practice will 
have consequences for both prohibitive cost and low 
quality, or unnecessarily high quality, for the patients with 
limited information about the given treatment's 
effectiveness or diagnosis. In a large mixed health system, 
it is virtually impossible to monitor each transaction in the 
market. Therefore, the regulation of healthcare 
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Figure-1: Health finance stylised facts.
establishments is inevitable if a level playing field is 
intended in the healthcare markets of LMICs. The 
regulation of health industry includes the certification of 
staff, regulation of pharmaceuticals sales, actions against 
quackery and issuance of license to healthcare 
establishments to enter or operate in the market. There is 
a dominant view that without third-party certification or 
licencing the healthcare quality in the industry will be 
suboptimal.4 
Since the start of the current century, public policy focus 
in many countries has been shifted from the cost of 
healthcare to the quality of service provisions. Although 
universal access of healthcare at an affordable cost is a still 
priority for many governments, the regulatory authorities 
in the mixed health systems, like in Pakistan, have started 
raising concern on the quality of healthcare. Third-party 
health certifiers play a pivotal role in quality regulation 
enforcement in medical care. Third-party certification 
affects both the demand for healthcare and the incentives 
to improve healthcare quality.4 Health report cards and 
pay for performance (P4P) compensations are two 
popular policy options in this regard. The report cards 
provide information about a health facility to patients and 
decision-makers, while P4P compensations link pay 
incentives to performance quality of a healthcare worker. 
The regulation of healthcare sector and third-party 
certification of providers is not common in LMICs, where 
healthcare bodies to regulate service provisions are in 
early stages.1 In Pakistan, Healthcare Commissions (HCCs) 
were established during the first of half of the last decade 
in most of the provinces to regulate quality of healthcare 
provisions. After the devolution of the health sector to the 
provinces, provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) established HCCs in their 
respective domains through provincial legislation to 
regulate public and private healthcare providers.5,6 One of 
the main functions of HCCs is to issue licences to all public 
and private healthcare organisations (HCOs) for providing 
healthcare services. According to the Punjab Healthcare 
Commission (PHC), an HCO or health establishment is 
defined as: "a hospital, diagnostic centre, medical clinic, 
nursing home, maternity home, dental clinic, 
homeopathic clinic, 'tibb' clinic, acupuncture clinic, 
physiotherapy clinic or any other premises or 
conveyances wholly or partly used for providing 
healthcare services".6 
To regulate large private establishments along with 
public providers looks like an ambitious government 
plan. There is significant investment involved in the 
establishment of quality care regulation. However, once 
effective quality regulation is in place that can improve 
the service delivery quality for millions in the country. 
Therefore, a parallel research agenda needs to be 
established to evaluate the current interventions by HCCs 
and to study how this investment in third-party 
regulatory bodies benefit the public and healthcare 
providers. To generate proper understanding of third-
party certification in the current context in Pakistan 
requires research. The current reviews was planned to 
study the current relevant literature and to study the 
objectives and progress of PHC, which is the largest HCC 
in Pakistan. PHC was selected as a case study for the 
purpose. Also, PHC was selected because the other 
provincial HCCs in the country are still in the formative 
stage, while PHC is well-established since the approval of 
the act by the provincial assembly in 2010. This paper 
analyses third-party certification role of PHC and draws 
lessons for future policy-making and strengthening of the 
quality reporting process. We also planned to analyse the 
gap resulting from forcing quality certification in the 
absence of appropriate alternative investment in medical 
training and care provisions in the country. 
This paper is divided into three further parts. The first 
section below discusses the current state of third-party 
certification in healthcare in selected markets around the 
world, and documents the objectives of healthcare 
certification and progress to date. The next section 
analyses the case of third-party certifiers and documents 
PHC's progress with the focus of the role of regulators in 
collecting information from providers and practitioners 
and the process of making this information available for 
patients and public. The last section synthesises the 
findings from international practice of third-party 
certification and the current practice of licensing by PHC. 
We analyse how HCCs can achieve the intended targets of 
certification practice and how better quality data can be 
generated to improve the current processes. Lessons are 
also drawn for future policy and further research. 
Third-party certification in healthcare 
Third-party certification, regulation, and quality reporting 
are interlinked topics in the economics of quality 
reporting in healthcare. The apparent link is that 
certification and reporting will require enforcement 
through an authority such as a regulator or a healthcare 
commissioner. The exact nature of the institutions which 
enforce quality control and regulation differs across 
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
provides national guidance and advice to improve health 
and social care, while Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
functions as the independent regulator of all health and 
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social care services.7,8 Both NICE and CQC are non-
departmental public bodies and are in contrast with the 
National Health Service (NHS). In India, the National 
Accreditation Board of Hospitals and Healthcare Providers 
(NABH) was established in 2006 for the accreditation of 
public and private healthcare providers.9 NABH is 
employing patient and provider-based quality measures 
for the accreditation of quality standards. Given the 
nature of healthcare market where asymmetric 
information is prevalent, quality control in healthcare is 
central to the regulatory bodies. The essential role of 
monitoring and reporting quality is to provide 
appropriate information to the decision-makers, 
including patients and practitioners, that will generate 
better incentives and increase efficiency of service 
delivery in the health system.  
Third-party certification falls under the realm of quality 
assurance in healthcare. The two key instruments used in 
this context, in sequential order, are licencing of 
providers, like hospitals and doctors, and disclosing 
information to the patients. Both activities are interlinked, 
as data collection is not possible without a formal 
registration process at the first stage. Licensing is a 
regulatory process which allows a firm's entry into the 
market; without a licence the healthcare establishment 
cannot operate legally. Licencing involves a certification 
activity in a sense, as the licencing authority collects data 
on the quality from a provider and then confirms that the 
quality exceeds a certain quality threshold. After 
certification, the licencing authority or a third-party 
evaluates and repots data about quality to the public. For 
instance, Healthgardes collects and reports extensive 
data on United States healthcare market for decision-
making to connect patients and providers.10 
Licencing healthcare establishment sends signals to 
patients regarding the quality of the services. But given 
that a licence is essential to operate in the market, it is not 
easy to differentiate healthcare providers merely based 
on licensing. The licencing alone will not solve the limited 
information problem because provision of healthcare is 
an "experience good" by nature. Alongside formal 
certification, the report cards have been adopted as main 
quality assurance mechanism in many markets around 
the world. Dranove discussed other quality assurance 
mechanisms in detail and has listed shortcomings of 
other leading mechanisms, such as branding, personal 
experience, and warranties in the context of healthcare.4 
The key finding is that where other quality assurance 
measures failed to work in healthcare, the space was 
captured by healthcare report cards or consumer report 
cards. The regulation in Pakistan is so far focussed on 
licencing of providers and certification of professionals. 
The implementation of health report cards might benefit 
the public depending on design and utilisation of these 
cards.  
Although inputs, processes and outcomes are three 
important components, most of the report cards are 
based on the clinical outcome (Table-1). The key 
questions regarding the definition and measurement of a 
health report card are worth having a look at (Table-1). In 
the US, 'Medicare' reports death rate for heart attack or 
rate of readmission as outcome measures relative to US 
national rate for a given hospital.11 As the evidence shows 
in the US market, the selection of outcome measures for 
reporting is not problem-free. The choice of outcome 
measures affects healthcare provider behaviour 
depending on the nature of adverse selection, 
multitasking problem, and quality distortion problem. 
Dranove reviewed these challenges and reported results 
on report card performance.4 The literature so far has 
focussed on evaluation of the programmes and not much 
has been done on designing an optimal scheme.4 
Previous studies have addresses three broad type of 
questions that are relevant to measure the effectiveness 
of third-party certification and licencing in healthcare 
industry.4 First, do healthcare providers provide the right 
information to regulators or patients? Second, does more 
information and knowledge effect the choice of patients 
while selecting the healthcare? Third, does providing 
more information to patients and third-party reporting 
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Table-1: Economics of healthcare provider quality reporting: taxonomy. 
 
Goal                                                                                                                                    What to measure?                                                                                    Challenges 
 
Provision of more information through                                                                    u Outcomes or changes in clinical outcomes:                                      u Health outcomes are hard to measure 
report cards for the patients, the doctors the regulator                                      mortality rates, surgical complications                                                   or poorly measured at provider level 
for better incentives to enhance efficiency and                                                    u Process: Implementation of SOPs adoption                                      u Adjusting for health status risk is difficult. 
improve decision making.                                                                                             of accepted processes and guidelines.                                                    u The healthcare provider will report or 
                                                                                                                                               u Inputs: Human capital, staff                                                                  pick the measures that shows all is good. 
                                                                                                                                               development, trained nurse ratios.                                                           
 
Source: Dranove (2011).4
improve quality of healthcare? The answer to these 
questions can be useful in evaluating new licencing and 
certification initiatives in Pakistan and other LMICs. 
Literature has answered the above questions regarding 
report cards in recent years. For the current review, 
studies were selected after search on Medline database at 
Elton B. Stephens Co (EBSCO) with key words "report 
cards AND healthcare OR "health care" for the period 
between January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2017.  
Do healthcare providers disclose quality of service 
provisions? Most scholars start with Grossman's 1981 
theory of unravelling which suggests that under certain 
assumptions, providers will disclose information even in 
the absence of third-party certification.12 However, the 
two important assumptions for theory of unravelling are 
untenable in most situations prevailing in LMICs. The first 
assumption says that in a given market healthcare 
providers are fully aware of quality of each other. The 
second assumption says that beliefs about quality held by 
consumers are consistent with provider quality. Under the 
second assumption, a provider will declare quality only if 
it is certain that quality is higher than the general belief 
held by the consumers.4 Healthcare professionals also 
voluntarily declare some information, like their 
professional qualifications which are prominently 
displayed in the clinics. 
Studies show a mix evidence for the certification of 
providers and provision of care quality to patients and 
community. Based on the evidence collected from the 
review, some findings require attention. There is 
conflicting evidence on the impact of quality disclosure 
on hospital mortality rates. There is some evidence of 
positive health gains in more competitive markets.13 This 
finding is important for healthcare markets with the 
presence of large number of private providers as these 
providers will be competing for consumers in a giver 
market, and disclosure can result in potential vertical 
sorting.  
There is also evidence that providers improve quality 
reporting standards after the implementation of third-
party certification requirement which is accompanied by 
more consumer awareness about comparative hospital 
quality.14,15 The improvement in hospital reporting of 
quality is not free of problem if there are incentives in the 
reporting of the listed indicators. Hospitals can also 
improve the reporting on indicators which shows a better 
picture of the hospital rather than improvements in actual 
care experience of the patients. Finally, studies show that 
there is need to improve the reporting standards and 
better-designed health reporting system for the 
certification process.4,16 
Quality regulation and licencing in Pakistan 
The regulation of healthcare sector and third-party 
certification is not common in LMICs and the quality care 
regulators are in their early stages in many countries.1 
Lack of regulation of health industry is considered a major 
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Table-2: Summary of selected studies on third-party certification. 
 
Study [Year/Country]                                                                                                                     The impact of exposure to information  
 
Brown et al [2013/US]20 No evidence of substantial use of public reporting of cardiac surgeon report cards, no substantial use of publicly available information by doctors 
at the time of discussion or referral for cardiac surgery.  
Chen & Meinecke [2012/US]21 No evidence on patient selection by providers, only minor decline (0.05 percentage points) in mortality rate for patients with bypass surgery.   
Chou et al [ 2014/US]13 Yes: After the availability of online report cards, hospitals in more competitive markets used more resources per patient and achieved lower 
mortality among more severely ill patients.  
Kraska et al [2016/Germany]14 Yes: Results indicate a positive effect of public reporting on hospital care, independent of a hospital's profit orientation. Improvements in the 
quality of care were registered for all observed quality indicators over time, but public reporting stimulated a faster improvement in quality. 
Maggard-Gibbons [2014/US]18 Yes: Findings show that feeding outcomes back to healthcare providers, along with real-time comparisons with other hospital rates, leads to 
quality improvement, better health outcomes, cost savings and overall improved patient safety. 
Paddock et al [2015/US]22 No: Current information not useful due to low variation in the report cards score. Analyses illustrate the need for further innovations in the design 
of public report cards to enhance their utility for consumers 
Pesis-Katz et al [2013/US]23 Yes: Evidence on choice consideration in nursing home selection. Consumers choose a nursing home based on the quality dimensions that are 
easy for them to observe, evaluate, and apply to their situation. 
Scanlon et al [2015/US]24 Yes/No: Investment in care quality information provisions results in modest change in awareness about physician quality among patient with 
long term conditions. But no significant increase in awareness of hospital quality was observed in the study. 
Shi et al [2017/US]15 Yes: Among those who were not aware of physician quality at the baseline the likelihood of physician quality awareness increased by 3.8 
percentage points once physician information was available in community. 
Sinaiko et al [2012]16 No: Authors found broad agreement that public reporting has been disconnected from consumer decisions about providers because of 
weaknesses in report card content, design, and accessibility. 
Werner et al [2016/US]25 Yes: The nursing home star rating system significantly affected consumer demand for high- and low-rated nursing homes.
challenge and the absence of checks in health system 
results in low quality and inequitable health service 
delivery.5 The current research on the economics of 
healthcare also demonstrate that since the last decade, 
public policy focus has shifted to quality considerations 
from cost considerations.4 The reporting of medical 
negligence, maladministration and malpractice cases is 
common in LMICs.1,17 Similar realisations have led 
provincial governments in Pakistan to put in place legal 
provisions for installing healthcare quality regulators. 
These organisations are formed to improve quality of 
healthcare and ban quackery in medical practice. We 
planned to focus on the Punjab province only as the care 
commissions in other provinces are in very early stages of 
formation while in Punjab, the commission is functional 
since 2010. The framework of quality regulation is quite 
similar in other provinces as well, where all the regulatory 
bodies are formed through provincial legislation. 
The experience of PHC and related analysis are based on 
data from published and official PHC sources, including 
PHC's social media account and its website.6 The analysis 
is conducted to address two fundamental questions; how 
PHC collects and processes the information related to 
quality of providers; and what are the actions by PHC that 
might signal or directly provide information about 
provider's quality to the public and patients. 
In Punjab, the third-party certification process consists of 
key components of registration and licensing of the 
providers. Registration and licensing are two interlinked 
but distinct concepts. According to the PHC Act, "an 
unregistered healthcare service provider shall not provide 
healthcare services". Licencing is the second stage of 
third-party certification. The mechanism of registration 
and licencing is public knowledge (Figure-2). It is evident 
that without PHC registration, no one can provide 
healthcare services in the medium to long run otherwise 
penalties will be implemented by the commission for any 
violation of the PHC Act 2010. 
The coverage of registration and provisional licence data 
compiled by PHC shows that in total 57,221 healthcare 
providers are registered with the PHC.6 The private 
providers account for 91%, which highlights the scale of 
private healthcare in the provision of overall health 
services in the most populous parts of the country. The 
nature of limited information problem in medical practice 
and existence of private healthcare provision at such a 
large scale requires an effective regulatory regime. 
Therefore, the establishment of regional HCCs in Pakistan 
looks like a step in the right direction. About 71 % of the 
registered providers have been issued the provisional 
licences by the PHC. Disaggregated data shows that only 
54% of the registered public healthcare providers are 
provisionally licensed, while this figure is 73% for the 
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Figure-2: Healthcare commission's registration and licencing mechanism.
private providers (Figure-3). 
The issuance of provisional licence is a signal of quality of 
healthcare in terms of data collected by PHC. The provider 
licence is usually displayed along with certification of 
healthcare staff at the site and a visiting patient can 
observe and consider it as a minimum quality (e.g. 
signalling) at a provider. Although it is not clear why 
regular licence has not been issued to any healthcare 
provider so far, as according to the PHC policy, the regular 
licence has to be issued within 30 days of the acceptance 
of the application.  
According to the PHC Act, "the 
commission may, before issuing the 
license, inspect the healthcare 
establishment which is to be licensed…". 
It means providers with provisional 
licences are subject to a regulator visit to 
verify the "information about provider 
services" and, if validated, the regulator 
then issues the regular licence. The non-
verification of providers by PHC and not 
confirming regular licence to majority of 
providers raises quality concerns and 
underlines the prevalence of poor-quality 
healthcare service delivery at a wider scale 
in the country.  
Recently, PHC has launched a helpline for 
public to report any fake healthcare 
establishment, and has encouraged 
patients to approach only the licenced 
providers. It means licence will be a 
signalling for quality certification and will 
improve the service delivery. Further, PHC 
is providing information on the anti-
quackery actions through print, electronic 
and social media. PHC has closed more 
than 6,000 clinics run by quacks and this 
process continues.6 The quackery 
prevalence appears quite high in the 
region; in size equal to one quarter of the 
total licenced private providers. More than 
70% of these quacks were operating in 
conventional medical care. The 
geographical concentration of sealed 
clinics appears to be high at about 75% 
happened to be in just 4 districts of the 
province. Therefore, a further 
understanding of nature and extent of 
anti-quackery actions is required to 
analyse the regional variation in the 
prevalence of quackery. According to the 
PHC Act, the commission works "to 
improve quality of healthcare services and ban quackery 
in the Punjab in all its forms and manifestations". Apart 
from the quality assurance action of PHC, policy actions 
described below will have far reaching implications for 
the largest healthcare delivery system in the country.  
Lessons learned and way forward 
The discussion thus far raises relevant questions. First, the 
licencing of large number of private providers in Punjab 
confirms the high prevalence of private medical care in 
Punjab which shows that substantial healthcare demand 
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Source: Authors compilation from PHC (2019)6 
 
Figure-3: Number of registered and licenced healthcare providers in Punjab.
falls on private providers. If the private providers are 
competing for patients in a competitive market, then 
disclosure of medical care quality will increase patient 
welfare.18 The better knowledge about quality of 
providers can lead to sorting of patients over providers, 
where the share of patients with high-quality providers 
will increase after the disclosure of the information. This 
hypothesis needs to be tested in Punjab in the context of 
PHC's current and proposed interventions. Second, as 
literature shows that lack of variation in quality reporting 
at provider will not be of much attraction for patient 
decision making, the current licencing practice by PHC 
will not create substantial variation in reporting, as either 
a provider will be licensed or not licensed. The current 
practice of licencing in Pakistan need to be augmented 
with further quality reporting on providers. Although PHC 
is implementing the minimum service delivery standards, 
further research is required to understand the impact of 
this practice on quality of reporting to patients.6 
Designing the report card and appropriate instruments in 
the local context shall be high on the future research 
agenda.  
Third, how to motivate people to attend licenced 
provider? This shall be a key arear of research. For the time 
being, PHC advertises and announces through social 
media and encourages public to report fake providers and 
to attend licenced providers only. How effective are these 
current quality reporting measures? And how the digital 
revolution, smartphone, and internet access can be 
capitalised to provide information on quality of the 
providers to patients and stakeholders? Further research 
is required to address these questions. 
Finally, there is little knowledge available on the extent 
and uptake of various service providers. The government 
data in Punjab shows that about 80% demand of primary 
care nature is catered to by private healthcare providers, 
potentially including informal providers, like quacks.19 In 
this context, anti-quackery intervention by PHC will have 
substantial consequences on the healthcare market and 
the welfare of patients in the region. So far, PHC has 
closed down 6,000 clinics where healthcare services were 
provided by non-qualified staff. The closure of providers 
at such a large scale will burden the licenced providers 
(particularly public) or will suppress the healthcare 
demand. Although, PHC is running training workshops, it 
is not clear how far untrained staff form closed facilities 
will benefit from these limited trainings. Further research 
is required to understand this balance between training 
the untrained staff at non-licenced facilities and 
restricting healthcare care provisions to only licenced 
providers. 
Conclusion 
Over the last decade, health policy focus has shifted from 
cost considerations to quality concerns in the delivery of 
medical care. HCCs are established to regulate healthcare 
quality at the provincial level in Pakistan by providing 
third-party certification. The evidence on number of 
licenses issued by PHC showed that private providers 
were operational at a large scale in Punjab in a 
competitive market. Literature review also found that the 
disclosure of the quality leads to better healthcare 
provisions in competitive healthcare markets. Therefore, a 
provider level health quality information reporting 
mechanism in the shape of a report card can potentially 
impact the quality of care in a competitive healthcare 
market like Punjab. Licencing or certification reveals 
healthcare provider quality. However, to differentiate 
among providers for quality requires reporting of health 
outcomes along with the licencing practice by PHC. There 
is need of further evidence collection to test many policy-
related hypotheses proposed in the paper. 
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